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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Medicare Statute May Extend Appeals Rights to Assignee
Physicians But Not Non-Assignee Physicians
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a
medicine statute extending appeals rights to assignee physicians, but not
to non-assignee physicians is permissible.'
At various times in 1992 and 1993, plaintiffs Robert Sloan and
Kenneth Y. Sunew performed concurrent invasive monitoring on patients
undergoing surgery at various New York hospitals.2 Sloan accepted
assignment for some, but not all, services Sunew did not accept
assignment for his services.4
Sloan and Sunew had exercised their option to refuse assignment of
their patients' Medicare claims for concurrent invasive monitoring
procedures performed on or after January 1, 1991. 5 Plaintiff alleged the
carriers' determinations of the Medicare-approved charge directly
impacted their ability to bill patients by limiting charges for their
services.6 They further asserted because they had no right under the
regulations to appeal, they had no recourse to rectify the alleged improper
fixing of the charge.7 Specifically, Sloan and Sunew asserted the
Department of Health and Human Services violated the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), and the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection and
Due Process rights. 8
The court found the Secretary's decision to extend appeals rights
only to assignee physicians as apermissible interpretation of the Medicare
statute.9 By granting appeals rights to assignee-physicians, the regulation
encourages physicians to accept assignments, thereby decreasing
additional charges to patients.' The court affirmed the findings of the
appellate court, dismissing appellants' claim that the non-extension of
'See Furlong v. Shalala, No. 97-6220, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23549, at * 12 (2d Cr. Sept.
23, 1998).
2See id. at *12.
3See id.
4See id.
SSee id. at *13.
6See Furlong, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23549, at *14.
7See id. at * 14.
8See id.
9See id. at *22.
"°See id. at * 20.
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appeals rights to non-assignee physicians violated APA." Furlong v.
Shalala, No. 97-6220, 1998 U.S. App. LEXMS, (2nd Cir. Sept. 23, 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Employment Anti-Discrimination Provision of the ADA
Held an Invalid Exercise of Congress's
Enforcement Power
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
dismissed the plaintiff s complaint of employment discrimination under
both the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the state Human
Rights Law (HRL).12 The court found a lack of subject matterjurisdiction
to decide whether plaintiff suffered a disability under the ADA because of
immunity to suit which state Department of Transportation had under the
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. 13
The court dismissed the complaint on the basis of whether the state
had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits in federal court
or if Congress had abrogated immunity through statutory law. 14. Because
the court found neither situation applied to the plaintiffs suit, the
plaintiffs claim of alleged discrimination under HRL was dismissed.'-
The court also found that there was no state waiver of immunity under the
ADA claim. 6 The court concluded that while Congress was clear in its
intent to abrogate the state's immunity, the ADA's provision for non-
discrimatory employment was not a valid exercise of Congress's power.17
The provision was invalid because the imposition of a duty to
accommodate any disability up to a point of undue hardship was too
broad.' The provision did not take into account any evidence that refusal
to accommodate was irrational or driven by deliberate discrimination.19
"See Furlong, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23549, at * 14.
12See Kilcullen v. New York State Dep't of Transp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 133, 136 (N.Y. 1999).
'"See id. at 136.
'
4See id. at 137.
'"See id.
'
6See id. at 152.
"
7See Kilcullen, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
"
8See id.
19See id.
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Furthermore, the costs of a reasonable accommodation for a state
employer would likely be higher than for a private employer29 Because
non-discriminatory employment was an invalid exercise of Congress's
power, and Eleventh Amendment immunity applied to the defendant, the
court found a lack of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff s
claims. 21 Kilcullen v. New York State Dep "t of Transp., 33 F. Supp. 2d
133 (N.Y. 1999).
CONTRACT
Government Obligated to Make Annuity Payments
Under the Military Claims Act When an
Insurance Company Went Into Conservatorship
and Payments Were Reduced
The United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, reversed a Court of
Federal Claims' decision which granted summary judgment in favor ofthe
United States government in a case involving an agreement to pay a claim
under the Military Claims Act (MCA).' The court held that the
government was required by federal law to make payments, which were
agreed to in the settlement regardless of the fact that the annuity became
deficient through a conservatorship of the insurance company. 3
The United States entered into a settlement agreement after the
plaintiff suffered injuries at birth while at a naval hospital."4 The
agreement included a purchase of an annuity by the government on the
defendant's behalf.25  Subsequent to the settlement agreement, the
insurance company, through which the annuity was purchased, went into
conservatorship and instituted a rehabilitation plan which the plaintiff s
opted to participate in but which significantly reduced the amount of the
original agreed upon payments.26 The plaintiffargued that the government
20See id. at 149.
'See id. at 152.
'See Massie v. United States, 166 F.3d 11 S4, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing 10 U.S.C §§
2731-38 (1994)).
2Seeid. at 1188.
24See id. at 1186.
25See id.
'
6See id. at 1185, 1186.
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was now in breach of the original settlement agreement by virtue of the
fact that the annuity payments no longer corresponded to those originally
agreed to. 7 Alternatively, the government argued that the agreement did
not include a guarantee on the annuity payments and, as such, prevailed
on these grounds.28
The two issues the court considered were whether the lower court had
jurisdiction over the claim, and whether the government had breached the
contract instituted at the settlement. 29 The court determined that the Court
of Federal Claims had jurisdiction by virtue of the Tucker Act, in cases
where there is a valid contract made with the United States, and that
Congress had not expressly stated that another entity shall have
jurisdiction.30 Although the government argued that jurisdiction was
displaced by the MCA, which covers military claims payments under the
direction of the Secretary of Defense, the court noted the MCA did not
pertain to the breach of agreements to compensate for plaintiff's claims.3 1
Since the agreement at issue was less like a procurement agreement and
more like an express contract in which each party relinquished the right
to litigate in return for settlement benefits, the court held MCA did not
displace jurisdiction in this instance.32
In determining whether the contract had been breached by the
government, the court considered whether the plain language of the
agreement gave rise to an interpretation that the annuity payments were
compulsory, as the plaintiffs argued, or whether, as the government
argued, only the type of annuity purchased was guaranteed.3 The court
concluded that the plaintiff s interpretation was more accurate and that the
government was not released from the obligation to pay as agreed simply
by relegating the duty of paying to the life insurance company.
Furthermore, the court held that a provision in the contract which required
a highly rated insurance company did not imply that the government
relinquished control over the payments upon purchase. 35 Additionally,
27See Massie, 166 F.3d at 1188.28See id. at 1186.
29See id. at 1187, 1189.
30See id. at 1184, 1188.
3'See id. at 1188.
'2SeeMassie, 166 F.3d at 1189.
33See id.
34See id. at 1190.
3'See id.
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since the government drafted the contract the court read this ambiguity in
favor ofthe plaintiff. 6 Massie v. United States, 166 F.3d 1184 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
Hospital Bylaws Do Not Constitute Contract for
Continuing Right to Staff Privileges
The Supreme Court of Iowa held hospital bylaws did not constitute a
contract with plaintiffs for continuing right to staff privileges.37
In January 1995, the Genesis Medical Center entered into a contract
with Anesthesia and Analgesia, P.C. (A & A) under which services had
previously been provided by fifteen other anesthesiologists, including
plaintiffs who had been on staff at Genesis since 1994.33
Under the medical center's new contract, A & A was to be the
exclusive provider of anesthesiology services, subject to a provision in the
contract allowing independent anesthesiologists, including plaintiffs, to
provide services under agreement With Genesis within a limited time
period.39 Any extensions of the deadline were subject to A & A's
consent.40 Furthermore, the Genesis-A & A agreement provided that A &
A would not unreasonably vithhold its consent to an extension of the
deadline.41
Plaintiffs, who initially refused Genesis's offer, later attempted to
enter into a contract ith Genesis after the deadline.42 While A & A
consented to tvo extensions of the deadline, they refused to consent to a
third.43 Plaintiffs sued Genesis, A & A, and the medical director of
anesthesia services at the hospital on several theories, including breach of
medical staff bylaws. 4 Plaintiffs argued Genesis, by entering into an
exclusive agreement With A & A and a separate medical director's
contract, revoked or curtailed plaintiffs' medical staff membership rights
36see id. at 1189-90.
'7See Tredea & Wells v. Anesthesia & Analgesia P.C. & Genesis Med Ctr, ,No 163'9G-
1117, 1998 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 205, at *1, 22 (Iowa Sept. 23, 1998),
3"See id.
3"See id.
40See id. at *2.
4'See Tredea & Wells, 199S Iowa Sup. LEXIS 205 at *31.
42See id. at *6.
43See id.
44See id.
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and clinical privileges to provide patient care.45 They sought damages
based on breach of contract of the medical staff bylaws.46
The court found the hospital bylaws did not constitute a contract so
far as any continuing right to staff privileges, and held in order for these
bylaws to be considered an agreement for continued employment, the
plaintiffs must establish "with sufficient definiteness" that an offer of
continued employment was a part of the agreement.47 No such agreement
was expressed in the bylaws .4 Accordingly, thejudgment of the trial court
was affirmed.49 Tredea & Wells v. Anesthesia & Analgesia, P.C. &
Genesis Med. Ctr., No. 163/96-1117, 1998 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 205 (Iowa
Sept.23, 1998).
DISABILITY
Private Insurance Must Apply to an Employee Who Claims
Total Disability Because Sickness First Began
When Employee was Able to Work
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded a
summary judgment claim in favor of defendant insurance company
because plaintiff employee was entitled to total disability benefits.
Plaintiff was entitled to benefits because he was employed as a surgeon
when the insurance policy was initiated."
Early in his career as a surgeon, plaintiff purchased an insurance
policy to protect him from any impending disability.5 Fourteen years
later premature atrial contractions prohibited him from continuing
surgery.52 He then became a medical director for an HMO. 3  His
45See id. at *20.46See Tredea & Wells, 1998 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 205, at *20.47See id. at *31.48See id.49See id.
oSee Goldberger v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 165 F.3d 180, 181 (2d Cir. 1999).
5 See id.
52See id. at 182.
3See id.
[Vol. 3:143
CASE BRIEFS
condition worsened, permanently prevented him from returning to work.6
Plaintiff then applied for total disability under the policy.5
Thepolicy clarified in order forbenefits to be received, sickness must
be revealed while the policy is valSee id. Furthermore, total disability is
defined as preventing an employee from performing normal tasks.6
After plaintiff applied for total disability, the insurance company
denied benefits. Defendant claimed the policy implied that the insured
must have been performing his regular occupation. 3 Defendant argued
that plaintiff's most recent occupation was not surgery when the claim was
filed, therefore, benefits were denied.59
The court found state insurance law mandates when there is an
ambiguity in an insurance policy, it must be construed to favor the
insured.60 Furthermore, because the policy expressly stated that in order
to recover benefits, the sickness must appear when policy is in force the
court refused to grant summary judgment and remanded the ease. (
Goldberger v. Paul Revere his. Co., 165 F.3d 180 (2nd Cir. 1999).
Falsity in Employer's Explanation for Termination in
FMLA Claim Requires Further Proceedings
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a
lower court's decision which granted the defendant employer's motion for
summary judgment in a suit by plaintiff employee, who claimed that
termination by the employer was discrimination under the American with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and also in retaliation for exercising rights under
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)( 2 The court found that there
was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the employer's explanation
for the employer's termination.63
See id.
SSee Goldberger, 165 F.3d at 182.
5 See id. at 181.57See id.
58See id.
59See id. at 182.
6OSee Goldberger, 165 F.3d at 182.61See id. at 183.62See King v. Preferred Tech. Group, 166 F.3d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 1999).
63See id. at 894.
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The employee, after being diagnosed with an illness, took a leave of
absence under FMLA.64 The employee was also granted numerous leave
extensions by the employer. 65 However, after a release by the employee's
physician release to return to work, the employer terminated the employee
upon a failure to return to work.66 The plaintiff submitted affidavits and
depositions explaining his failure to return to work was due to the
employer's instructions not to return due to missing physician
documentation in the employee's file.67 While the employer's human
resources manager informed the employee of being unable to return to
work until the missing physician slips were replaced, the employer never
gave any further information regarding the number of missing slips or the
dates of the missing slips. 68
Under FMLA, the employee must establish that the employer
engaged in intentional discrimination, similar to any other retaliatory
discharge case.69 If the employee does not have any direct evidence of
discrimination, the employee must show employment in a protected
activity, the employer terminated that employment, and a causal
connection between the protected activity and the termination existed.70
Since the employee met this initial step, the employer had the burden to
show a legitimate reason for terminating the employee.71 The employer
succeeded by demonstrating that at the time of the termination, all the
employees were part of a collective bargaining agreement that allowed
automatic termination if the employee did not return to work at the
expiration of the leave of absence.7 2 The employee was fired due to this
policy.73 Since the employer gave a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for terminating the employee, the burden returned to the employee to
show falsity in the employers reasoning for the dismissal.74 The court
found that there was evidence supported by affidavits and depositions to
show that the defendant's explanation for the employee's termination was
"See id. at 890.
6 See id.
"See id.67See King, 166 F.3d at 894.
6"See id.
'9See id. at 892.
70See id.
1See id.
72See King, 166 F.3d at 893.
7See id.
'
4See id. at 893-94.
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false.75 Thus, the court held that the lower court's summary judgment
order was inappropriate and the court remanded the case for further
proceedings. 76 King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166F.3d 887(7Tth Cir.
1999).
Preclusion of an ADA Claim Not Automatic Upon the
Receipt of Disability Benefits Where Unpaid Medical
Leave Amounts to a Reasonable Accommodation
The United States Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded a lower court's decision granting summary judgment to an
employer when an employee, who suffered from syncopal episodes,
alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 7 The
court held an issue of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was a
qualified person with a disability and whether the plaintiffposed a "direct
threat" to others because of her disability.7
The plaintiff was a sales associate for Wal-Mart who received
benefits including short-term medical leaves of absence for up to one
year.79 After suffering three syncopal episodes, the plaintiff, with the
advice of her employer, went on extended medical leave and applied for
state temporary disability benefits (SDI). She was subsequently treated
by several physicians and hospitalized for the disorder.2' During one
hospitalization, the employer attempted to contact her at home without
success and subsequently terminated her employment." This termination
occurred without notification by certified letter and accompanying three-
day response period as per company policy."
The court determined the lower court erred in finding the plaintiff
was not a qualified person with a disability.84 The lower court determined
the plaintiffwas not a qualified person since her application statements for
75See id at 894.76See id.
7'See Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,164 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1999).
78See id. at 1245-48.79See id.
';See id.
"'See id.
"See Nunes, 164 F.3d at 1246.
"See id. at 1245-46.
"See id.
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SDI benefits precluded a recovery on her ADA claim, and because her
doctors had also certified on her SDI application an inability to do the
essential functions of herjob on the date as of her termination date." The
court determined application for disability benefits does not automatically
bar a plaintiff from establishing that she is a qualified person with a
disability under the ADA and that the lower court misapplied the
"qualified person" standard.8 6 Furthermore, the court determined it was
inaccurate for the lower court to find that the plaintiffwas totally disabled
at the point of her termination.
817
A "qualified person" under the ADA is one who is able to perform
the essential functions of her job "with or without reasonable
accommodation. 8 The court found the lower court erred in failing to
acknowledge that unpaid medical leave could be considered a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA if it does not impose an undue hardship
upon the employer.89 However, this determination required a fact-specific,
individualized inquiry.90 Because of the need for this determination
coupled with the fact that the plaintiff was a good employee who went on
medical leave at the advice of her employer, the court found there existed
issues of material fact as to whether the leave of absence constituted a
reasonable accommodation. 9'
The court similarly determined the existence of material issues of fact
as to whether the plaintiffposed a "direct threat to the health and safety of
other individuals in the workplace."9' In determining whether a direct
threat exists, the court is required to consider first whether the employer
has demonstrated that the employee cannot perform the job without a
significant risk of harm.93 Secondly, the court must evaluate whether the
employer can make a reasonable accommodation so the employee can
perform the job without this risk.94 The Ninth Circuit determined the
lower court failed in this analysis by virtue of the fact that a significant
risk was found based only on doctors' testimony taken two years after the
"See id. at 1245
86See id. at 1246.
87SeeNunes, 164 F.3d at 1247.
"See id. at 1246.
89See id.
90See id.
9 1See id. at 1246, 1247.
92See Nunes, 164 F.3d at 1247.
9'See id. at 1247-48.
94See id. at 1248.
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termination date and therefore not in evidence at the time she was
terminated." Furthermore, this testimony failed to establish that the
plaintiff posed a significant risk to others.% Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 164 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir 1999).
FOOD DRUG ADMINISTRATION
Nicotine Addiction Fails for Medical
Monitoring Claim
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held smokers
failed to meet the requirements of Fed. P. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) to be certified
as a class for the claim of medical monitoring.97
Plaintiffs were Pennsylvania residents who began smoking cigarettes
before the age of 15 and who had smoked for many years. 3 Plaintiffs filed
an amended complaint against the major American tobacco companies
alleging the claim formedical monitoring.9 Plaintiffs sought certification
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) for "[a]ll current residents of Pennsylvania
who are cigarette smokers as of December 1, 1996 [the day the amended
complaint was filed in federal court] and who began smoking before age
19, while they were residents of Pennsylvania."' O In Pennsylvania, a
plaintiff, to state a claim for medical monitoring, must establish the
following:
(1) exposure to greater than normal background levels;
(2) to a proven hazardous substance;
(3) caused by the defendant's negligence;
(4) as a proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff has a
significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent
disease;
(5) a monitoring procedure exists that makes the early detection
of the disease possible;
95See id. at 1248.
95See id.
97See Barnes v. The American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 130 (3d Cir. 1993).
93See id. at 130.
'See id. at 131.
"c"Id. at 131, 132.
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(6) the prescribed monitoring regimen is different from that
normally recommended in the absence of the exposure; and
(7) the prescribe monitoring regime is reasonably necessary
according to contemporary scientific principles.1"'
The court announced to be certified, a class must first satisfy the four
elements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a):
(1) numerosity;
(2) commonality;
(3) typicality; and
(4) adequacy of representation. 2
The court explained, after the first four elements are established, a class
will only be certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) if the final relief
sought satisfies the class as a whole. 03 The court held while plaintiffs met
the conditions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) for class certification, the class
could not be maintained under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because nicotine
addiction must be detemined on an individual basis.104 Thus, the relief
sought per potential class participant would not satisfy the class as a
whole.10 5 Accordingly, the court denied plaintiffs' class certification for
the claim of medical monitoring. 06 Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161
F.3d 127 (3rd Cir. 1998).
FDA Regulation Requiring Pre-approval of Health Claims
for Dietary Supplement Labels is Vague and
Violated the First Amendment
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
a lower court decision dismissing plaintiffs' suit challenging a Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) rule requiring FDA pre-approval of certain
...See id. at 138.
"°See Barnes, 161 F.3d at 140.
'"
3See id. at 141.
'O°See id. at 146.
"°
5See id.
"
06See id.
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dietary supplement claims by the manufacturer.'0 7 This FDA pre-approval
was required before the manufacturers could place health claims for
certain diseases on the product label.'
The plaintiffs, as dietary supplement manufacturers, failed to
persuade the FDA of four health claims."' 9 The FDA refusal to approve
the health claims was based on the lack of a "significant scientific
agreement" standard for the validity of dietary supplement health
claims."0 The FDA, while stating the evidence was inconclusive, never
defined how "significant" was to be measured."' Furthermore, when the
plaintiffs suggested the use of FDA disclaimers to supplement the health
claims, the FDA refused." 2  The plaintiffs claimed that their First
Amendment rights had been violated, since under the Administrative
Procedure Act, the FDA needed to state how the "significant scientific
agreement" standard was measured." 3
The court held the manufacturers' First Amendment rights were
violated when the FDA declined to use disclaimers in this case."4 The
court found such a violation as a restriction of commercial free speech,
determining while a government interest exists in ensuring the accuracy
of marketplace advertisements, the FDA rule did not meet this interest!"5
The court held disclaimers would be constitutionally preferable to
complete suppression of the health claims, especially when there was no
evidence that the plaintiffs supplements threatened consumer safety." 6
A prominent disclaimer could indicate the inconclusiveness of the
evidence relating to the particular dietary supplement. 17
The court also found that the "significant scientific agreement"
standard was vague and unarticulated, and reversed the district court's
decision with instructions for the FDA to reconsider the rule. " The court
held on the remand the agency must be specific and adequately explain
'
07See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
...See id. at 652.
'OSee id. at 653.
"Old.
"ISee id.
"See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 654.
.See id.
4See id. at 658.
"'See id. at 657.
"'See id. at 656.
'See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 659.
".See id. at 660.
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any rejected labeling claim." 9 Such FDA action would then be sufficient
guidance towards defining the "significant scientific agreement"
standard. 20 Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS
Certification Denied for Class of Plaintiffs Alleging Fraud
and Unjust Enrichment because No Reliance for each
Class Member can be Shown
The Court of Appeals of Florida reversed a trial court decision certifying
a class of plaintiffs who field suit against the defendant HMO.12' The
court would not certify the class under the state law because class actions
seeking relief from separate contracts on the basis of fraud were
prohibited. 22
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant either misrepresented and
or failed to disclose terms of its arrangements with its physicians and
primary care physicians to potential enrollees, alleging claims for fraud
and unjust enrichment. 123 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Humana
failed to disclose that
(1) the physicians were paid a fiat rate per month,
(2) Humana's financial arrangements with the physicians created
an incentive to not treat,
(3) permission was required from Humana before a physician
could admit a member into the hospital,
(4) that Humana's contracts with the physicians contained "gag
clauses," and
(5) members had to use Humana providers for treatment. 2 4
-See id.
'
20See id. at 661.
.
t See Humana Inc. v. Castillo, 728 So. 2d 261, 264 (2d Dist. 1999).
'2See id. at 264.
1'See id.
'
24See id. at 26 1.
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The plaintiffs attempted to represent a class of those persons who had
enrolled in the particular Humana plan between 1987 and 1997 by filing
a motion to certify the class.
125
The trial court certified the class of plaintiffs by focusing only on the
defendant's course of conduct and at whether the defendant had failed to
disclose material facts during the sale of its HMO.1 6 However, the Court
of Appeals applied state law in determining that a party asserting fraud
must also show that he or she would not have entered into the contract if
all the information had been disclosed. 27
The court held in order to certify a class, the trial court must first
determine whether the alleged class representatives can prove their own
individual cases.1 28 If the representatives cannot prove their own case,
including reliance in a fraud case, the class cannot be certified."2 9 The
court also found that under state law, class actions alleging fraud in
separate contracts are prohibited.' This is due to the fact while one
member of the class may have evidence of what was relied upon to form
a contract, such evidence may be lacking for another member of the
class.' 31 Because the plaintiffrepresentatives could not prove reliance for
each class member in their fraud case against the defendant, the court
therefore held the class could not be certified. 132 Hurnana Inc. v. Castillo,
728 So. 2d261 (2nd Dist. 1999).
INFORMED CONSENT
Physician's Lack of Informed Consent
May Constitute Battery
The Court of Appeals of Indiana held that a physician may be liable for
lack of informed consent, fraud, punitive damages for negligence, and
"'See id.
26See Humana, So. 2d at 263.
'27See id.. at 264.
'See id. at 265.
"See id.
13See id. at 264.
"'See Humana, 728 So. 2d at 265.
"'See id. at 265.
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battery. 133 The court reinforced the refusal of summary judgment on all
issues, since no genuine issue of material fact was found.
1 34
Defendant performed back surgery on plaintiff, his patient. Plaintiff
claimed defendant inaccurately explained the risks of the surgery,
misrepresented the risks, used inappropriate behavior eliciting punitive
damages, and fraudulently induced plaintiff to endure surgery, constituting
battery. 13
5
To provide informed consent, a physician must obtain written proof
from his patient that the procedure, patient's condition, risks of the
procedure, and any potential alternatives prior to the procedure were
clearly explained.136 Defendant told plaintiff that paralysis may randomly
occur if surgery was not performed. ' Because there was a question as to
whether or not the defendant provided an alternative to the plaintiff, there
was a genuine issue of material fact. 3 8 Thus, summary judgment was
denied.139
If a statement is fraudulent, it must be untrue and known to be untrue,
and known that another is relying on that fact. 140 While defendant claimed
that his statements were true, experts disagreed as to the truth of the
statement.' 41 Also, another court held that any physician who violates a
patient's informed consent commits battery. 42 Therefore the summary
judgment ruling must be reversed. 143 Cacdac v. West, 705 N.E.2d 506
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
'"See Cacdac v. West, 705 N.E.2d 506, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
134See id. at 506.
13See id. at 507.
136See id. at 508-09.
'
37See id. at 509.
'See Cacdac, 705 N.E.2d at 5 10.
'"See id. at 509.
MSee id. at 509.
14'See id. at 510.
142See id. at 511.
43See Cacdac, 705 N.E.2d at 512.
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INSURANCE
State Obligated to Operate Medicaid
Policy Through a Single Agency and
May Not Delegate Functions
The Court of Appeal, Second District, in California modified a lower
court holding that it was not illegal for the state Medicaid agency to
delegate certain functions including auditing and overpayment to the
Controller."M The issues addressed in this appeal involved whether the
laboratory had standing to bring a claim against the Controller and
whether the Controller was authorized under federal law to undertake
functions of the state Medicaid agency.45 The court ruled federal and
state Medicaid laws required a "single agency" to carry out agency policy
and through delegation of certain powers to the state Controller, the state
Medicaid agency was not properly complying with these laws.
146
Plaintiff, a diagnostic laboratory, provided physicians with testing
services and received a significant amount of its profits from Medicaid
patients.147 When the state Controller withheld a portion of these
payments, the laboratory filed a complaint alleging it was illegal for the
state Medicaid agency to delegate certain functions to another entity. 43'
The court found the laboratory had standing, and rejected the
defendant's argument, that a "single agency" policy affected the plaintiff
by only indirectly precluding the plaintiff from taldng action. ' 9 Since the
case involved a writ of mandate, standing was appropriate since it was a
less restrictive standard applied to private interest. 15
According to federal law, the court found while the state may utilize
the services of other agencies in implementing policy, the state may not
delegate duties to other agencies." According to federal law, Medicaid
t4"SeeDoctor's Med. Laboratory, Inc., v. Connell, SI Cal. Rptr. 2d 829,830 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999).
145See id. at 832, 833.
'
45See id. at 832.
147See id. at 831.
l4 See id. at 830-31.
"'See Doctor's Med. Laboratory 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833.
"SSee id. at 831.
"'See id.
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agencies are to be strictly "single agencies. '  Thus, by delegating
auditing and remedial functions to the Controller, the state Medicaid
agency, in effect, was operating through two separate agencies. 1
53
Secondly the court determined that by delegating these functions to
the Controller, the state Medicaid agency was out of compliance with it's
own procedure for review. 54 According to federal law the agency was
required to have in place a review process to address any disputes prior to
attempting to get back any overpayments.155
The court further noted the state Medicaid agency represented to the
federal government the existence of its own agency branch that was
responsible for the identification of any excess payments and for
implementing corrective action. 156 The Controller's proper function, then,
was to issue checks in a non-discretionary manner.157 Therefore, the
agreement between the state Medicaid agency and the Controller
expanding the function of the Controller to include responsibilities of
Investigations Division was illegal.'58 Doctor's Med. Laboratory, Inc., v.
Connell 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
Denial of Mental Health Benefits May Be
Unreasonable, But Not an ERISA Violation
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that an
insurance company acted unreasonably when it denied mental health
benefits, but did not violate ERISA by neglecting to provide plaintiff with
mental health guidelines. 5 9 Because there was no ERISA violation, the
insurer cannot be penalized. 60
Plaintiff was founder, chairperson, and ChiefTechnical Officer of her
firm.' 6' She suffered a relapse of her mental illness, which was comprised
"
2See id. at 831 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1999)).
'
53See id. at 832.
154See Doctor's Med. Labatory, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833.
'See id. at 832-33.
"'6See id. at 831-32.157See id. at 831.
15'See id. at 832.
J59See Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53, 57, 59 (Ist. Cir. 1999).
"'6See id. at 60.
"'See id. at 55.
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of an increased sense of disquiet, depression, self-destructive behavior,
and suicidal tendencies.1 62
At the advice of plaintiffs psychiatrist, she investigated the
company's insurance policy regarding mental illness."63 She discovered
the insurance company would cover inpatient hospital care for mental
health needs when justified for no more than sixty days. " However, a
twenty percent co-pay applied to the patient. 61
Plaintiff's psychiatrist requested the insurance company's approval
of plaintiffs hospital admission. 6 The insurance company would not
approve because it did not believe the patient's slight suicidal tendencies
necessitated inpatient care. 67 The insurance company believed that
outpatient care would suffice. 6s Nevertheless, the patient checked into the
hospital.169
Plaintiff filed suit in a district court for breach of contract and
deceptive acts and practices. 70 Plaintiff won her case because the court
believed her claim had been plagued with many procedural errors.'' This
decision stated that plaintiff should have been reimbursed for her unpaid
medical costs, and that defendant had violated ERISA by neglecting to
provide plaintiff with the appropriate mental health guidelines.7 2
Defendant appealed. 7 3
Under this particular policy the insurance company not only has the
privilege to cover what is medically necessary, but also has the privilege
to decide what is medically necessary.' 74 The insurance company also has
the power to determine what is medically necessary.175 The court held that
a reasonableness standard must be applied to this dilemma and the
162See id.
'6'See id.
'6See Doe, 167 F.3d at 55.
165See id.
'"See id.
'67See id.
"'See id.
'69See Doe, 167 F.3d at 56.
170See id.
"'See id.
'72See id.
7'See id. at 56.
"74See Doe, 167 F.3d at 56.
7-'See id. at 57.
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insurance company unreasonably denied the patient's claim, seeing that
the patient had exhibited some suicidal tendencies.'76
However, the court did not agree that defendant violated ERISA.177
ERISA mandates that guidelines be sent out within thirty days of
request.1 78 Plaintiff requested the guidelines but did not receive it within
thirty days; instead they arrived approximately forty-five days later.
179
The court fined defendant for the tardiness, but did not consider
defendant's actions as a violation of ERISA.' 80
Finally, the court awarded attorney's fees and costs to plaintiff.181
This case was remanded to determine the amount of the fine. 182 Doe v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1999).
RICO Claims Against Insurance Companies May Not Be
Precluded By the McCarran-Ferguson Act if the
Federal Act Does Not Frustrate State Law
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed a Ninth Circuit Court's
holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which allows states to regulate
the business of insurance, does not bar a policy holder's claim against a
defendant insurance company under Racketeer Influence and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).'83 In affirming the decision, the Court
analyzed the extent that RICO was compatible with state regulations
governing the business of insurance.184
Plaintiffs, as policy holders of Humana's group health insurance,
agreed to pay twenty percent of their hospital charges, while Humana was
contractually responsible for the balance.'85 The plaintiffs claim was that
both the hospital and Humana secretly agreed to give the defendant
insurance company larger discounts, which resulted in the policy holders
paying significantly more than the designated portion of their hospital
" See id. at 58.
'77See id. at 59.
"'See id.
179See Doe, 167 F.3d at 59.
"'See id. at 59.
..See id. at 60.
182See id.
"'See Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 119 S. Ct. 710, 712 (1999).
'See id. at 714.
"sSee id. at 712.
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charges.1 86 Such action, the plaintiffs alleged, was a violation of RICO.'"
The district court granted Humana's motion for summary judgment,
holding that if RICO applied to the case at hand, the court would be
permitting Congress to intrude into an area that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act expressly left to the states.188 The McCarran-Ferguson Act allows the
states to regulate the business of insurance 89
The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit holding that the
plaintiffs suit under RICO would not impair, invalidate, or supercede
Nevada State law and thus, a RICO claim was valSee id." This "direct
conflict test was laid out in the McCarran-Ferguson Act."'' RICO's
private right of action and treble damages provision were similar to the
state's statutory and common law claims for relief for insurance fraud.'92
Also, both state and federal statutes have the same interest in combating
fraud.'93 Furthermore, RICO and the state laws governing the insurance
business do not directly conflict. 194 Therefore, the Court held that RICO,
by not directly conflicting or frustrating state regulations was not
precluded by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.195 Huniana Inc v. Forsyth, 119
S.Ct. 710 (1999).
JURY
If There is a Delay in an Objection to a Trial Court's
Determination of Prescription, it is Waived
The Court of Appeals of Louisiana affirmed the decision that a trial court
properly ordered prescription issues to be determined by a trial court.'9
The delay to object to the trial court's decision is a waiver.'97
IS6See id.
'"
7See id. at 715.
l8SSee Humana, 119 S.Ct. at 715.
'"
9See id.
"O°See id. at 716-17.
1
'id. at 716.
192See id. at 719.
193See Humana, 119 S.Ct. at 718.
'94See id. at 718.
19 See id. at 719.
"$See Doe v. Cutter Biological, 727 So. 2d. 1187, 1188 (La. Ct App. 1999).
'
97See id. at 1187-88.
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A hemophiliac commenced judicial action against a blood derivative
manufacturer. 198  Plaintiff claimed he acquired HIV from the
manufacturer's product. 99 A pre-trial order mandated any preliminary
motions must be filed within forty-five days of trial.2"' The issue at hand
was whether the trial court retained the task of determining prescription
to issues.20 '
As previously stated, failure to present an objection to the trial court
procedure comprises a waiver.20 2 Prior case law held that even if there
was ajustified reason for the delay, prescription issues are accurately tried
by the court, not the jury.2 O3 Furthermore, the trial judge is perfectly
capable of handling such a matter.20 4 Therefore, the right was waived and
the trial court will try the prescription issues.20 5 Doe v. Cutter Biological,
727 So. 2d 1187 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Physician and Department Clinic Are Held
Immune Under Governmental
Immunity Act
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed a lower court ruling that a
defendant physician volunteering part time at a public clinic was not a
public employee and lacked immunity under the Colorado Governmental
Immunity Act (GIA).20 6 The court also reversed the lower court's refusal
to dismiss the claim against the County Department of Health and
Environment, finding the clinic was a public hospital under the GIA, and
thereby did not waive its immunity.20 7
198See id.
'
99See id.20 See id.201See Doe, 727 So. 2d at 1187.
202See id.203See id.204See id.205See Doe, 727 So. 2d at 1189.
2
.See Plummer v. Little, No. 97 CA 1273, 1999 WL 21339 at *1 (Colo. Ct. App., Jan. 21,
1999).207See id. at *3.
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The patient brought a negligence claim against the physician for
failure to diagnose breast cancer in a timely manner. 10 The physician
claimed that he was a "public employee" under the GIA since he
volunteered at a community-sponsored clinic part time.269 As a "public
employee" under the GIA, the physician asserted immunity as a defense
to the patient's claims.210 The patient also claimed that the Department
was liable under the theory of respondeat superior.2 11 The Department
claimed the clinic was not a hospital under the GIA, thereby retaining
immunity in an action seeking compensation for injuries.212
The court held that the physician was considered a "public employee'
according to the GIA, and was entitled to assert immunity as a defense to
any malpractice claims.213 The physician was considered a public
employee since he treated the patient within the scope of his duties as a
part time volunteer at the clinic. 4
Furthermore, the court held that the clinic was not a hospital
according to the GIA.21 ' The court looked at the intent of the lawmakers
as well as the common meaning of "hospital" and "clinic."' 1 The clinic
lacked inpatient services, therefore, it did not meet the meaning of the
term "hospital" under the GIA. 17 Because the court dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaints on the basis of subject matterjurisdiction, the court
offered no decision regarding the liability claim against the Department
under the theory of respondeat superior.218 Plummer v. Little, 1999 WL
21339.
20
'See id. at * 1.
"& See id.
2
'See id.21
'See Plummer, 1999 WL 21339, at *1.212See id.213See id. at *3.214See id. at *2.21See id. at *3.216See Plummer, 1999 WL 21339 at *3-4.2 17See id. at *4.2t8See id. at *5.
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Physician Breached Duty to Provide a Second
Informed Consent, Causing Substantial
Injury to a Newborn Child
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the decision that a physician
violated a patient's right of informed consent by neglecting to initiate
another informed consent discussion when patient's circumstances
substantially changed by withdraw of consent to deliver her baby
vaginally. 19
Patient was in labor with her third child.22 ' Her previous pregnancies
resulted in cesarean deliveries.2 1' However, plaintiff and physician had
thoroughly discussed the possibility of vaginal birth after cesarean
(VBAC) and plaintiff consented to that strategy.2
As plaintiff s labor progressed, she experienced immense abdominal
pain.2 3 As a result, she changed her mind and wanted to have a cesarean
delivery.224 She repeatedly informed her physician of the desire for a
cesarean delivery.225 The physician was unable to determine the source of
the abdominal pain, and he advised plaintiff to continue with the VBAC.
226
However, after the baby's heart rate plummeted and the physician
conducted an emergency cesarean.227 The cesarean delivery was not done
in time; the uterus ruptured and the baby was deprived of oxygen, causing
the baby to be born a spastic quadraplegic.228
The parents sued the physician for negligently misdiagnosing
plaintiff s abdominal pain, and violating patient informed consent rights,
but eventually the negligence claim was dropped.229
The circuit court held that a physician does not need to seek new
consent unless there was a significant change in the patient's medical
219See Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 588 N.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Wis. 1999).
22°See id. at 28.
2'See id.
2nSee id.223See id.
224See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 28.
2ZSee id. at 29.
226See id.
22See id.
2Ssee id.
29See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 29.
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condition 3 0 Furthermore, informed consent must do more than explain
the methods available to the patient.231 Informed consent must obligate
the physician to carry out these wishes as long as treatment is possible,
reasonable, or viable.3 2
Here, the patient's repeated proclamation to have a cesarean section
delivery constituted a withdrawal of consent to a VBAC, which was a
significant change in the patient's circumstances?3 3 Since consent for
VBAC was withdrawn the physician was obligated to initiate another
informed consent discussion.3 4 Again, this informed consent discussion
should include the benefits and risks of the medical altematives? 5 The
physician finally stated that he would have fulfilled her wish had she
pursued it.23
6
The objective test is applied to typical informed consent cases.2
There is an issue as to whether or not the patient was given enough
information to make an informed decision."3 However, in this case, the
issue is whether or not patient had the chance to make the choice, which
elicits a subjective test?39 Applying the subjective test, that the patient
would have chosen cesarean section if she had the choice.40
When the patient withdrew her original consent to carry out the
VBAC there were still alternative, feasible options.24 As a result, the
physician had a duty to initiate another consent discussion.242 Seeing that
this discussion never took pace, plaintiff was deprived of her first choice
of treatment, a cesarean delivery which let to her child's irreversible
injuries. 43 Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 588 N. W2d 26 ( Wis.
1999).
"'See id.
23'See id.
"2See id.
233See id. at 3 I.
'ASee Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 32.
"3'See id. at 32-3.
'"See id.at 33.
"'See id.
"'See id. at 34.
"See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 34.
"'See id.
241See id. at 35.
242See id.
243See id.
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Hospital Pharmacist Has No Duty
to Warn Patients of Potential Adverse
Side Effects of Medications
The Court of Appeals of Washington affirmed a lower court decision,
which granted summary judgement for a hospital in a negligence claim
and entered a verdict for a physician in a medical malpractice claim.
2 44
The court held no duty to warn existed with follow up hospital personal
since such a duty would interfere with the physician/patient relationship.2 45
Following an injury to a toe the plaintiff entered a hospital for
treatment and was prescribed indomethacin, an anti-inflamatory
medication by the examining physician.2 46 He then received instructions
regarding the drug from a discharge nurse.247 Finally, he received the
medication from the hospital pharnacist.243 After taking the prescribed
medication, the plaintiff suffered a pulmonary hemorrhage since he was
also taking heparin for ablood clotting condition.249 Although the hospital
staff testified that it was generally known that a combination of heparin
and indomethacin may cause adverse reactions, the plaintiff was given no
warning of this other than written instructions given to him by the
discharge nurse.250
The three issues analyzed up by the court were whether the
examining doctor was liable for prescribing a drug which caused a
negative reaction with the plaintiffs previous medication, whether the
discharge nurse had a duty to warn the plaintiff of a risk of possible
negative side effects of a drug prescribed at a hospital, and whether a
hospital pharmacist had a similar duty with respect to the medication
administered.251
The court found the hospital pharmacist did not have a duty to warn
the plaintiff of the risk of adverse reactions by combining heparin and
2
"See Silves v. King, M.D., 970 P.2d 790, 792 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
245See id. at 794-96.246See id. at 793.247See id.243See id.249See Silves,970 P.2d at 793.
2'°See id. at 790-94.
'2'See id. at 793-96.
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indomethacin.252 According to the court, since there was no absolute error
in combining these drugs the pharmacist was not acting out of negligence
when filling the prescription.5 3 The court noted that while a pharmacist
does have a duty to correctly fill a prescription, the institution of an
additional obligation to warn would transform the pharmacist/patient
relationship into a physician/patient relationship.' This was unfair since
these judgements concerning medications properly rest with the
physician.25
The court also held the hospital discharge nurse was not negligent in
failing to inform the plaintiff of possible material risk for drug
interactions.256 With respect to the situation involving the discharge nurse
the court drew a parallel to the discussion involving the pharmacist.27
The court concluded that the weighing of material risks of this nature
more properly rested in the hands of the physician.253 Thus, to hold the
discharge nurse negligent would, in effect, interfere with the relationship
between the physician and the patient259 Similarly, the court declined to
find the discharge nurse negligent for failing to review the written
instructions with the plaintiff, since such a decision would impose a duty
on the discharge nurse to review all written instructions with all
patients.26" This decision was based on the fact that patients could easily
read the instructions and, in fact, were asked to sign a statement attesting
to the fact that the instructions were read and understood.26
With respect to the issue of whether the lower court properly found
in favor of the physician, the court held the lower court did not err in
failing to admit the plaintiffs prior medical records which included an
evaluation of whether the plaintiff was fit to return to work. '2 The court
held that since this record was irrelevant to the plaintiffs medical
diagnosis it was not admissible under a medical records exception." -3
'S2See id. at 794.
2SSee id.
2'See Silves, 970 P.2d at 794.
255See id.
2'6See id. at 795.
2"See id.
28See id. at 796.
259See Silves, 970 P.2d at 795.
2"'See id.
161See id. at 796.
262See id.
263See id.
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Since this was the only issue, which the plaintiff raised on appeal with
respect to the count of malpractice against the physician the court held the
lower court properly found in favor of the physician in the trial below.2 64
Silves v. King M.D., 970 P.2d 790 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
MEDICARE/MEDICAID
Failure to Provide Medicaid Benefits for Sex Change
Operation May Violate Due Process Clause
of Fourteenth Amendment
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa held a
Medicaid recipient was entitled to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause based on a denial of
his request for Medicaid benefits for sex reassignment surgery. 65
The state of Iowa participates in the joint federal-state Medicaid
program under Title XIX of the Social Security Act pursuant to a state
plan approved by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services.266 Plaintiffrequested payment for sex reassignment surgery from
2671 hthe Iowa Medicaid program. Under the state plan, reconstructive or
plastic surgery is not covered by the program.263 While sex reassignment
surgery was excluded from the general rule of no coverage for
reconstructive surgery initially, it was also later excluded in 1994 as a
covered surgery based on a literature review indicating continuing
controversy regarding sex reassignment surgery as a treatment for gender
dysphoria.269 Gender dysphoria is the belief that one is imprisoned within
a body incompatible with one's real sexual identity.270 Based on a 1994
amendment to the state plan, the plaintiffs request for payment was
denied.27' On May 17, 1997, plaintiff filed a compliant pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
26See Silves, 970 P.2d at 797.265See Smith v. Palmer, 24 F. Supp. 2d 955, 968 (N.D. Iowa, 1998).266See id. at 957.
267See id.268See id.26 9See id.270See Smith, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 957.271See id.
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alleging a violation of the federal Medicaid statute 42 U.S.C § 1396 et
seq.272 On June 1, 1998, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
on the grounds plaintiff s allegation of a violation of the federal Medicaid
statute and its regulations failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and plaintiffs allegation of violation of the due process clause was
without merit.
273
The court found plaintiff stated a proper cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 because a genuine material issue of fact existed as to
whether sex reassignment surgery was a medically necessary treatment for
plaintiff's gender dysphoria.2 4 Additionally, the court found plaintiff
stated a proper cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause since the state's Department of Health and Human
Services' reliance on a private physician's literature review as a
reasonable exercise of its discretion in implementing regulations for
excluding sex reassignment surgery created a genuine issue of material
fact.275 As a result, the court denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment.276 Smith v. Pahner, 24 F. Supp. 2d 955 (N.D. Iowa 1998).
Establishment of a Special Needs Trust Did Not Affect
State Medicaid Agency's Right to Reimbursement
Upon Settlement with Third Party Tortfeasors
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in a trial which
combined two similar cases, reversed two lower court decisions and held
a state Medicaid agency was entitled to recover the full amount of benefits
paid out to plaintiffs after they were awarded a judgement against third
party tortfeasors.277 The court reached this conclusion even though special
needs trusts were in place in behalf of the recipients.7T
Both plaintiffs suffered injuries due to malpractice and received
Medicaid benefits to assist in their treatment.2 9 Subsequently both
272See id. at 956.273See id.
274See id. at 957.
7 See Smith, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
276See id. at 969.
27See Waldman v. Candia, 722 A.2d 581, 583 (N.J. Sup.Ct. 1999),
278See id. at 585.
279See id. at 583.
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plaintiffs were awarded settlements in their malpractice cases and a
portion of the settlements were put into special needs trusts for the benefit
of the plaintiffs.28' The plaintiffs were notified by the state Medicaid
agency that they were obligated to contact the agency prior to settlement
of their claims so that a lien amount could be established.28t
In both cases the lower courts declined to allow the state Medicaid
agency to collect part or all of the amount previously expended in
benefits.282 In one case the lower court reasoned federal Medicaid law
preempted state law and thereby precluded a state from establishing a lien
on funds that properly paid for medical assistance prior to a person's
death.283 The state could only obtain monies from a trust after the death
of the recipient.28 4 The second case differed only in that the lower court
limited the state Medicaid agency to place a lien on the portion of the trust
connected to the plaintiffs medical expenses and exempted the portion
connected to the plaintiffs "future needs. 285
Plaintiffs in these cases argued that federal Medicaid law states that
special needs trusts are outside of the realm of recoverable finances when
a Medicaid lien is being established.286 The court disagreed with this
interpretation and pointed out that while certain trusts are not taken into
consideration when determining financial eligibility for Medicaid, it does
not follow that these trusts are outside of the reach of Medicaid liens when
the situation involves recovery from third party tortfeasors.287 The reason
certain trusts are not considered in determining Medicaid eligibility is so
that a beneficiary may maintain funds while still being able to obtain
Medicaid benefits.288 The court stated that ideally a Medicaid lien should
be imposed prior to the institution of a trust.289 Thus, the Medicaid lien is
actually against the finances of the third party tortfeasors and not the
Medicaid recipient.290
28 See id.23ISee id. at 582-83.282See Waldman, 722 A.2d at 583.28 SSee id.214See id.28 SSee id. at 584.286See id.287See Waldman, 722 A.2d at 586.288See id.289See id.290See id. at 585, 586.
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The court found the holdings of the lower courts were invalid due to
the fact that by the reasoning posited below, a recipient of Medicaid
benefits could avoid having to reimburse the state agency simply by
setting up a special needs trust.29" ' This reasoning goes against the spirit
of the complementary state and federal Medicaid laws, which are in place
to provide medical assistance to those who are seriously in need.2 ' Thus,
the court concluded because the plaintiffs in these cases received Medicaid
assistance when it was needed by the respective state and federal agencies
those agencies were entitled to fully recover when the claims were
settled.293 Waldman v. Candia 722 A.2d 581(N. J Sup. Ct. 1999).
MENTAL HEALTH
Order for Involuntary Administration of
Medication Struck Down Due to a Lack
of Specific Statement of Type
and Dosage of Medication
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second District reversed the
judgement of the lower court that authorized an order calling for
involuntary administration of psychotropic medication by the State of
Illinois.294 The court found reversal was appropriate since the state's
petition had not alleged a good-faith determination on whether the
respondent had executed an advance health care directive; that the state
made no attempt to prove that the respondent would have consented to the
medication if he were competent; and that the order did not specify the
type or dosage of medication to be administered. 95
The state petitioned for involuntary administration of medication for
the respondent based on the testimony of a psychiatrist at the mental
health facility at which the respondent was undergoing treatment.2  The
psychiatrist diagnosed the respondent with psychosis and stated the
'2'See id. at 586.
29
2See Waldman, 722 A.2d at 586.293See id. at 587.
'See In re Len P., 706 N.E.2d 104, 108 (I11. App. Ct. 1999).2 SSee id. at 104-08.
'2SSee id. at 106.
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respondent did not have the capacity to make a decision regarding the
administration of his medication.297 The psychiatrist further testified that
the benefits of the medication would outweigh any negative side effects.298
The court found a procedural error was created when the state failed to
allege a good-faith determination on whether an advance health care
directive had been executed by the patient. 299  However, the court
concluded this procedural error was harmless due to the fact that it should
have been obvious at the time the pleading was filed and if the respondent
had objected in the trial court it would have been easily corrected."'
Secondly, the court held the "substituted judgement standard" was
not inaccurately applied.0 ' The substituted judgement standard is a devise
by which a surrogate decision maker attempts to establish the decision the
respondent would have made were he competent.302 The court noted an
objective standard of reasonableness is appropriate when the wishes of the
patient were not clearly proven and that this objective standard should be
based on evidence actually presented.30 3
Thirdly, the court decided the order granting involuntary
administration should be reversed due to the fact that the State failed to
specify the particular drug and the dosage to be administered.304 The court
based this decision on the fact that the Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Code explicitly mandates that the order specifically state the
type and amount of medication to be administered. 3 5 The fact that the
respondent failed to raise this issue at the trial did not preclude a ruling on
it since it was not merely a procedural defect but is also an element of the
substantive right of the patient.0 6 The court emphasized the exact kind of
medication was essential in showing that the benefits of the medication
would be greater than any adverse effects.30 7 In re Len P., 706 N.E.2d 104
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
2 97See id.293See id.299See In re Len P., 706 N.E.2d at 107.
'3'See id.
3"See id.
"°2See id.
33See id. at 108.3
°4See In re Len P., 706 N.E.2d at 108.
30'405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 (West Supp. 1997).
3"6SeeIn re Len P., 706 N.E.2d at 109.
3°TSee id.
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NEGLIGENCE
Liability Under EMITALA Requires Plaintiff
to Be Physically Present
The United States District Court for the district of Hawaii held a patient
cannot sue a hospital under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Law (EMTALA) for liability that arises when the patient was not
physically on the hospital premises.3"'
On May 5,1996, the plaintiffpatient experienced difficulty breathing
while on his way to work.30 9 When the ambulance arrived plaintiffwas in
severe respiratory distress. 310 The ambulance drove him to the nearest
medical facility, which was defendant Queen's Medical Center.31 1 En
route, the ambulance personnel spoke by radio with defendant physician
of Queen's Medical Center about plaintiffs condition.3" Defendant
physician inquired as to who plaintiff's physician was and was told that
plaintiff was a Tripler Hospital patient.313 Defendant physician instructed
the ambulance personnel to initiate treatment and take the patient to
Tripler Hospital, located five miles from Queens.3 4 The patient
experienced cardiopulmonary arrest two minutes after arriving at Tripler,
and died twenty-four minutes later.315
Plaintiffs sued under the EMTALA alleging negligence. 316 Because
physical presence is required in order to trigger EMTALA liability, the
court found no liability, and affirmed the findings of the district court.317
Arrington v. Wong & Queens Med. OYr., No. 98-00357 US. Dist. LEAIS
15137 (Haw. Sept. 23, 1998).
.
3 See Arrington v. Wong & Queens Med. Ctr., No. 98-00357, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15137, at *3 (Haw. Sept. 23, 1998).3CSee id.
3"'See id.
3'See id.
31See id.
"'See.Arrington, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15137, at *3.
3"4See id. at *3.
3'See id.
316See id. at *4.
"'See id. at *9-14.
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The Purpose of EMTALA is to Assure
Emergency Treatment to Those Who Need it,
Not to Ensure Patient is Transported
to the Hospital of Choice
The United States District Court forthe Southern District of Texas granted
summary judgment for defendant hospital charged with violating the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) when
an unconscious patient was transported to one hospital despite the
patient's supervisor's instruction to transport the patient to another
hospital.318
Defendant filed a summaryjudgment motion because plaintiff did not
meet requirements of EMTALA by properly presenting himself to
defendant.3"9 Also, defendant claimed not to be responsible for fulfilling
supervisor's instructions to transport patient to another hospital.32
Plaintiff was injured on the job and was unconscious when the
ambulance arrived.32' Defendant's ambulance company answered the
call.322 Plaintiffs supervisor instructed the ambulance drivers to take the
patient to Mission Hospital. 323 However, the patient was taken to Starr
County Hospital, which was owned by the ambulance company.324
Plaintiff claimed defendant violated EMTALA by not fulfilling
employer's request to take the patient to Mission Hospital.325
EMTALA requires that the patient "comes" to the emergency
department. 326  The court held plaintiff did not fail to meet the
requirements of EMTALA because he did "come" to the hospital
emergency room.32 7 A federal district court ruled that a patient arrives at
3
'8See Hemandez v. Starr County Hosp. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 970, 971 (S.D. Tex 1999).31gSee id. at 972.320See id.32tSee id.
322See id.
323See Hernandez, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
324See id.
32See id. at 972.
32 6See id.327See id. at 973.
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an emergency room when he or she enters the ambulance owned by that
hospital.3 2S Thus plaintiff adequately met EMTALA's requirements.
329
However, the court ruled defendant did not violate EMTALA by
transporting patient to a hospital different from the one requested.3  The
purpose of EMTALA was to ensure that all in need of emergency
treatment receive it, not to decipher to which hospital the patient should
be transported.331 Hernandez -v Starr Counwy Hosp. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d
970 (S.D. Tex 1999).
PRIVACY
Patient Failed to Establish Violation of Privacy
Arising From a Physician's Disclosure of the
Patient's Medical Condition
The Supreme Court of Hawaii held a physician did not violate patient's
right to privacy when the physician disclosed his diagnostic impressions
of the patient's medical condition to a federal prosecutor .3 3  The
prosecutor had been ordered to secure the patient's examination after
patient checked into hospital rather than appear for criminal trial.3 3
On August 13, 1994, plaintiff was charged with three counts of
willfully failing to file federal income tax returns in violation of26 U.S.C.
§ 7206.334 Plaintiffs trial was scheduled to start on September 13, 1994.33s
At the time of the scheduled trial, the Assistant United States Attorney
informed the district court of plaintiffs hospitalization on the previous
night for back problems.336 The court immediately ordered the United
States Attorney's Office to have a physician examine plaintiff.33 When
the United States Attorney contacted the hospital to make arrangements
32nSee Hernandez, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 973.
'f'See id.
3SSee id.
33'See id.
332See Dubin v. Wakuzava, 1998 WL 824549, at *9 (Haw. Dec. 1, 1998).
"'See id.
34See id.
33S5ee id.
'
6See id.
" See Dubin, 1998 WL 824549, at *1.
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for the examination, he was advised plaintiff had already been discharged
on the grounds he had no physical condition warranting a continued stay
in the hospital.3 8 Based on this information, the district court found
plaintiff was physically and mentally fit to participate in the trial and
immediately issued a warrant for the plaintiff's arrest.339 On December 19,
1996, plaintiff filed an amended complaint against the physician and the
hospital, alleging, among other things, breach of patient-physician
relationship.340 On January 7, 1997, the physician filed a motion to
dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint on the grounds the patient waived
any right of confidentiality by putting his medical condition at issue when
he checked into the hospital the night before his scheduled criminal
trial.34' Therefore, the disclosure was permissible pursuant to the
provisions of Hawaii's Rules of Evidence (HRE) 504(d)(2).342
The court held while a physician owes a duty not to release
confidential information from the patient's medical records without
express written permission, the privilege was not absolute.343 The court
noted, even according to HRE 504, four exemptions including medical
examination ordered by the court, are not privileged physician-patient
communications.3" Thus, after finding no distinction between the court
ordering the examination or receiving information from an examination
already performed, the court held the physician did not violate the
patient's right to privacy.3 45 Dubin v. Wakuzawa, 1998 WL 824549 (Haw.
Dec. 1, 1998).
33"See id.
13"See id.
340 See id.
341See id.
342See Dubin, 1998 WL 824549, at *1.
43See id. at *6.
3'4See id.
34'See id. at *9.
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PROCEDURE
Judges Are Not the Proper Defendants in a Suit
Challenging the Constitutionality of an Act Allowing
Parents to Petition for a Court Order to
Commit Their Children to
Drug Treatment Programs
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' constitutional
challenge of a state act allowing parents or guardians to petition for a court
order to involuntary commit their children to drug and alcohol treatment
programs.346 The court dismissed the claim against three judges who
presided over the state actions involving the plaintiffs, ruling that the
judges were not the proper defendants. 47
The plaintiffs, as minors whose parents sought a court order for their
involuntary commitment to a substance abuse program, claimed the
commitment was unconstitutional on due process and equal protection
grounds.34s The plaintiffs contended thejudges, as enforcers of the statute,
were the proper defendants since under the act they had to act with
interests adversarial to the plaintiffs' motives.3 49 Furthermore, the judges
adversarial interests created a case or controversy according to Article I
of the Constitution.3 10
The court held that the judges were improper defendants in this suit
because they lacked either a personal or institutional stake in the
controversy. 35' The court also found that judges played no role in the
passing of the statute, nor were they initiators of the enforcement or
subsequent actions taken against the minors.3"2 The parents were the
parties that initiate the judicial determination, while the judges only acted
in their adjudicatory capacity.353 The court concluded that thejudges were
'See Brandon E. v. Reynolds, No. C1V. A. 98-4236 (1999 %V,L 98585, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 25, 1999)).
"'See id. at * 1.
3'See id. at *3.
"'See id.
350See id.
3"See Brandon E., 1999 WL 98585, at *4.
3'2See id. at *6.
"See id.
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making their decisions for each case only on the merits of the cases before
them, and were not acting in any administrative capacity.354 Because the
judges were only making neutral determinations in the case and basing
their decisions in each case solely on the merits of each case, the judges
are not the proper defendants in this suit.355 Thus, the plaintiffs failed to
state a claim for which relief may be granted.356 Brandon E. v. Reynolds,
No. Civ. A.98-4236 (Pa. Feb 25, 1999) (1999 WL 98585 (E.D. Pa.)).
State Claims Not Preempted by ERISA
Cannot Be Removed
The United States District Court of New Mexico reversed the decision to
remove a case because the claims do not arise under Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).357 To be preempted the claim
must be directly related to the benefits pursuant to the benefits plan.358
Plaintiff patient filed a medical malpractice suit in the state court
system to recover from injuries sustained from a vasectomy. 359 The claim
consisted of four counts: medical malpractice by the physician and
vicarious liability by the health care system; corporate negligence
resulting form the health care system's lack of monitoring patient care and
supervision of the physicians; negligence per se against defendant for
infractions of medical facilities' standard of care; and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.360 Shortly thereafter defendant health care system
commenced action for removal to a federal court because plaintiff's claims
were preempted by ERISA, due to the claims pertinent to the HMO
benefits plans.36' Defendant stated that these claims were preempted and
could be tried in a federal court.362 Plaintiff disagreed and asserted that his
claims did not arise under ERISA, instead, the claims were medical
3 4See id.3
"
55See id.
3
'
56See Brandon E., 1999 WL 98585, at *8.357See Herrera v. Lovelace Health Sys. Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1328 (D. New Mex.
1998). 35 See id. at 1330.
'"See id. at 1328.360See id.3 61See id.362See Herrera, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
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malpractice and negligence. 63 These later claims were state law causes
of action, which were not completely preempted."
According to the Supreme Court, complete preemption applies in tw-o
circumstances: when claims fall under either the National Labor
Management Relations Act or section 502 of ERISA. In ERISA, a
claim is only preempted when the claim pertains to an action to recover
benefits per the insurance plan.366
There has been much inconsistency as to whether or not a medical
incident that is incorrectly rejected by an HMO is completely
preempted.367 However, the majority of the courts have ruled that such
claims were not preempted for several reasons. 63 First, when medical
malpractice and vicarious liability claims would be resolved without
referring back to the insurance plan, such claims were not preempted." 9
More specifically, medical malpractice and vicarious liability were not to
enforce benefits, rather they were disputing administration of benefits or
enforcing privileges of the plan.370 Therefore they were not preempted.37'
Second, medical malpractice and vicarious liability claims do not attack
the benefits themselves, but rather the quality of the benefits.3  ERISA
mandates that benefits be provided.3 3 It never specified the quality ofthe
benefits.374 Third, if the claims (such as medical malpractice or vicarious
liability) can be rectified without analyzing the benefits contract, then the
claim was not preempted.375  Finally claims pertaining to negligent
supervision by the HMO were not preempted.376 Thus because the actual
plan was immaterial to the claim, they were not preempted by section 502
of ERISA.377 Herrera v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d
1327(D.N.M. 1999).
'-'See id.
'6See id. at 1329.
36See id. at 1330.365See id.
367See Herrera, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-32.
'
63See id.
36 9See id.
370See id. at 1331.
371See id.
372See Herrera, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
373See id.
374See id.
37See id.
376See id.
3'See Herrera, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
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Removal to Federal Court Improper
Where a Disability Insurance Plan
Covered Only Employer
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed a
lower court decision in favor of insurance company and held removal to
federal court was improper since it was not preempted by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).378 The court refused
to interpret ERISA to cover insurance plans purchased solely for a single
employer where the employer also purchased additional plans for
employees.37 9
Plaintiff, a physician, initially brought suit in Circuit Court when
defendant insurer failed to pay benefits of the disability policy.'s
Following this filing, the defendant insurer succeeded in removing the
case to federal court on the basis that the claim was properly governed by
the ERISA.38' Subsequently, plaintiffwas denied remand of the case back
to state court but allowed to amend the original complaint to include an
ERISA claim.382 Eventually a decision was handed down in which the
defendant insurer prevailed and the plaintiff appealed.383
The plaintiff solely owned a dental practice and provided health
insurance for himself and his employees. 8 4  Since the plan lacked
disability benefits, the plaintiff purchased a separate, additional disability
insurance policy for himself and made payments on it in the name of the
corporation.385 When the plaintiff attempted to collect on the disability
policy, the defendant, insurer argued that the claim should be brought in
federal court under ERISA' 8 6 The issue the court considered was whether
the claim was, in fact, governed by ERISA.387
378See Slamen v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 1102 (11 th Cir. 1999).379See id. at 1105-06.380See id. at 1104.38
'See id.382See id.383See Slamen, 166 F.3d at 1104.
384See id. at 1103.
38SSee id.386See id. at 1104.
3"TSee id. at 1103-1104.
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The court held the claim was not covered by ERSA.3 Five
elements are considered in a determination of whether a plan is under
ERISA.389 There must exist
(1) a plan which is
(2) set up
(3) by an employer
(4) to provide medical treatment and disability benefits to
(5) those participating in the plan.390
The court held the disability benefit plan did not satisfy these criteria
because the physician was not participating in the plan within his
employee status.391 Therefore, this plan did not technically cover any
employees, and, as such, could not be deemed to be covered under
ERISA.392 The court clarified this to mean at least one employee, outside
of an employer who also owns the business, must be participating in the
plan for it to be covered under ERISA.393 In this case the plaintiffwas the
only one participating in the disability benefits package.394 By virtue of
the fact that the plaintiff was the only participant receiving benefits under
the plan, he did not properly fit within this definition.395
The defendant insurer posited that since the plaintiff had in place
other benefit packages which did apply to all employees, the disability
plan should have been seer as merely one part to a consolidated benefit
package.396 Thus the consolidated package was covered under ERISA
because, taking it as a whole, numerous employees were participants. 311
The court, however, did not give merit to this argument and stated that a
plan would not be deemed part of an ERISA plan solely by virtue of the
fact that an employer contemporaneously offers other plans to
employees.393 Since the claim was not properly an ERISA claim no
3
"SSee Slamen, 166 F.3d at 1104.
3 SSee id.
...See id. (quoting Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (1 th Ctr. 1982) (en banc),
91See id. at 1106.
9
"See id.
'
93See Slamen, 166 F.3d at 1102.
394See id. at 1105.
39ISee id.
395See id.
397See id.
3"See Slamen, 166 F.3d at 1105.
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federal question was involved and, thus, the case was originally
improperly removed to federal court.39 9 Slamen v. Paul Revere Life Ins.
Co., 166 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 1999).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
Statute of Repose Extinguished
Plaintiffs' Cause of Action
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held the Statute of
Repose extinguishes the cause of action, regardless of when the cause of
action accrued. 00
In May, 1979, Plaintiff Pamela Craven retained an attorney, Daniel
Cullen, to pursue her minor son's (Brian Craven's) legal rights with
respect to the vaccine-induced polio that had left him permanently
paralyzed at the age of three months.40 ' Although he informed her "she
had a case," no suit was commenced against Cyanamid, the manufacturer
of the vaccine. 402 Eleven years later, Craven retained a new attorney, who
on September 27, 1990, filed a petition on Brian's behalf in the United
States Court of Claims under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation Act of 1986 (VCA).4°3 In 1994, Mrs. Craven changed
counsel again.40 4 Acting on the advice of new counsel, she withdrew the
VCA petition on November 25, 1994, leaving no pending action on her
son's behalf.40
5
The second plaintiff, Michella Kairdolf, sustained vaccine-induced
polio with attendant paralysis in 1982, three months after birth.4 6 The
Kairdolfs filed a petition on behalf of their minor daughter under VCA on
'99See id. at 1106.4
°See Craven & Kairdolf v. Cyanamid Co., No. 97-9548, 1998 LEXIS 25429, at * 10 (2d
Cir. Jun. 17, 1998).40 See id. at *3.4
°2See id.40 See id. at *4.4
°See id.40 See Craven & Kairdolf, No. 97-9548, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2549, at *4,4
°'See id. at *5.
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January 31, 1991.407 On October 24, 1994, acting on the advice of
counsel, they withdrew the petition, leaving no action pending. 3
On June 2, 1995, both plaintiffs commenced a putative class action
in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
against Cyanamid and its parent corporation.
In Craven's case, the statute of repose in Nebraska (birthplace of first
minor plaintiff) barred all product liability commenced more than ten
years after the product's sale "notwithstanding any other statutory
provision to the contrary. 410 Additionally, Craven's cause of action for
breach of express warranty under U.C.C. 2-725 (which is specifically
exempted from Nebraska's statute of repose) was barred because it must
be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. 4"'
In the Kairdolfs' case, the parties stipulated the Louisiana laws of
prescription (i.e. statute applied because second minor plaintiff was born
in Louisiana).4 1 2 A one-year time limit under Louisiana's prescription rule
applies when a causal connection between the product and the injury is
immediately discoverable.413 The court found that the Kairdolfs had notice
of the causal connection between Cyanamid's vaccine and minor
plaintiff's polio no later than March 1987.f The prescription period
expired in March 1988, seven years before plaintiffs brought suit.4 S
On September 21, 1998, the appellate court affirmed the district
court's ruling granting Cyanamid's motion for summary judgment, citing
both claims as being time-barred under their respective state's statutes. 41"
Craven & Kairdolfv. Cyanamid Co., No. 97-9548, 1998 U.S. App. LE.TS
25429 (2nd Cir. Jun. 17,1998).
4"7See id.403See id.409See id.41 See Craven & Kairdoyf, No. 97-9548, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 25429, at *541
'See id. at *22.412See id. at * 19.413See id. at *12.414See id.415See Craven &Kairdolf, No.97-9598, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 25429 at *12.416See id. *13.
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RECORDS
Records and Board of Directors Meetings of Hospital Are
Subject to Public Access Laws Despite the Fact
That the Hospital was Leased By Private
Not-for-Profit Organization
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed a lower court's decision that
records and minutes from board of directors meetings for a defendant not-
for-profit hospital were statutorily subject to the Public Records Act and
the Sunshine Law.417 The plaintiff corporation filed a complaint seeking
such records be open to the public. 418 The court reached its decision even
though the public hospital had been leased to a private not-for-profit
corporation to operate the hospital for the district's residents.419
The court held that the state constitution's provision requiring public
access to records applied, since the hospital's assets were from bond
issuances and tax receipts.420 Therefore, the court found the public should
have access to the records for the purpose of scrutiny.421 Furthermore, a
totality of factors demonstrated that the hospital, despite being leased to
a private corporation, was still acting on behalf of the public hospital
agency, serving the needs of the district's residents. 2 ' The private
corporation had been delegated authority to run the hospital only on an
interim basis.423 Also, there was no evidence that the legislature had
followed any of the express procedures to exempt the hospital from the
public records access law.424
The court also found that the hospital's board of directors meetings
were subject to the open meeting requirements of the constitution and the
Sunshine law.42 5 Because the board of directors were acting on behalf of
417See Memorial Hosp.-West Volusia, Inc. v. New-Journal Corp, 729 So. 2d 373,380 (Fla.
1999).4 18See id. at 375.
419See id. at 377.42
°See id. at 380.421See id.422See Memorial Hosp.-West Volusia Inc.,729 So. 2d at 379-80.42'See id.424See id.415See id. at 382.
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the public body in running the public hospital's business, the directors
meetings were constitutionally required to be open to the public.
4 2 6
Public access to records and minutes from board of director meetings
followed the transfer of authority to function, regardless of any leasing
arrangements between the public hospital and the private not-for-profit
corporation.4" Therefore the lower court holding requiring the disclosure
of records of the hospital and open meetings was affirmed. Memorial
Hosp.-West Volusia, Inc. v. New-Journal Corp., 729 So. 2d 373 (Fla.
1999).
TORTS
A Fund That Covers An Insolvent Insurance Company is Not
Liable for Tort Damages and Cannot Be Charged With
Bad Faith for Failing to Pay Those Tort Damages
The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed a partial summary judgment
favoring defendant insurance fund that assumed all covered claims for an
insolvent insurance company.48 This ruling deemed any tort damages
outside the definition of covered damages, and bad faith liability is not
applicable.429
Plaintiff's husband died and she filed a wrongful death suit against
a company whose insurance company went bankrupt.42 ' Defendant then
assumed financial responsibility for the insolvent company.4 31 However,
the insurance fund refused to cover or settle the situation involving
plaintiff.432
According to state statute the defendant claimed that it enjoyed
immunity from such tort claims.433 Defendant's purpose was to assume
42 See id. at 383.427 AfenorialHosp.-WVest Volusia, Inc., 729 So. 2d at 380.4
'See Bills v. Arizona Property and Casualty Ins. Guaranty Fund, No. 2 CA-CV 9S-130,
1999 WL 53050 (Ariz. App. Div. 2, Jan. 28, 1999).429See id. at *8, *10.4 0See id. at * 1.43
'See id.432See id.433See Bills, 1999 WL 53050, at *1.
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covered claims of insolvent insurers.434 A covered claim was an unpaid
claim that originated out of a coverage of the policy of the insolvent
insurance company.435 As a result, defendant had a direct relationship with
the insured pursuant to the terms and conditions of the policy and the state
statute.436 Good faith was implicit in this new relationship.437
When statutory language is unclear the court must turn to the
legislative intent and relevant statutory provisions.438 Upon further
investigation, the court decided that defendant was immune from tort
liability pursuant to A.R.S. -20-675 .43 Because there were no indications
otherwise, the court assumed that there was an oversight when the fund
was not expressly included in the statute.44 Thus, the court held that
defendant was limited to covered claims, not including tort claims.441
Courts decided if companies were not immune from bad faith it
would destroy the power of the immunity provision.442 Furthermore, since
defendant was not responsible for tort claims, there can be no bad faith
charges for failing to compensate for tort claims.4 43 Finally, the only way
a bad faith claim would be acceptable was if defendant handled covered
claims in bad faith.444 However, this allegation was never made.445
Finally plaintiff challenged defendant's actions with an equal
protection claim." 6 To do so, plaintiff must show that the legislation was
irrational or arbitrary. 447 The court held that plaintiffhad failed to do so. 448
Moreover, the legislation's limitation of defendant's ability to cover only
covered claims rationally advanced the state legislation's interest to
preserve defendant's integrity.449 Thus the court granted summary
judgment for the defendant, holding that defendant is not responsible for
4 34See id. at *2.435See id.436See id. at *3.437See id.438See Bill, 1991 WL 53050, at *1.43 9See id. at *3.
44'See id.
"'See id.
442See id.
443See Bill, 1991 WL 53050, at *6.
"
4 See id. at *4-5.
44'See id. at *8.
446See id. at *9.
447See id. at * 10.
44'See Bill, 1999 WL 53050, at *6.
449See id. at *11.
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the claims and had not acted negligently in failing to compensate.459 Bills
v. Arizona Property & Casualty Ins. Grp., 1999 WL 53050 (Ari. App.
Div. 2).
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
False Accusation of Embezzlement Constitutes Abnormal
Working Environment, Which Entitles Employees
to Workers' Compensation Benefits
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed a workers'
compensation decision which denied a worker benefits for a psychiatric
injury cased by accusation of embezzlement.45'
Plaintiffwas employed as an office manager for a family practice. " '
While her duties included general office manager tasks, the main task was
billing insurance companies.453 Plaintiffwas the only person in the office
with this task. 4 Problems arose when a particular physician randomly
reduced or waived fees for particular patients.45" Such inconsistency
caused the employee to resign.456 However, the employer refused to
accept the resignation and employee continued working. 57 The physician
found some mistakes that were potentially made by plaintiff, contacted top
level managers, and announced to plaintiff s coworkers that plaintiff was
stealing. 45S
After appearing in front of the top-level managers, plaintiff
maintained her innocence. 459 As a result of the accusations, the employee
encountered extreme emotional distress and depression, in addition to
other mental problems. 46' Her psychiatrist testified that the problem was
45 See id.
45 See Miller v. workers' Compensation Appeal Bd., 724 A2d 971, 978 (Pa. Conuw. Ct.
1999).452See id. at 971.453See id.
454See id.4
"SSee id.456See Miller, 724 A.2d at 971.4
'7See id.
4
"SSee id. at 972.4 59See id.46OSee id.
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triggered by a single occurrence.4 61 Despite consultants' analysis that
there was no trace of wrongdoing, the employee was still suspended.
462
To prove a mental injury, one must prove either the injury was
attributable to a particular event or it developed over a long period of
time.463 The court held that the audit itself was not atypical or the source
of injury; rather objective events such as embezzlement accusation caused
plaintiff s injury.464  Testimony by another coworker verified the
physician's constant inconsistencies regarding the billing.4 65  The
physician also admitted fear of fraud accusations and stated he needed to
protect his reputation. 66
The court held that the plaintiff was exposed to abnormal working
conditions when an employer accused him of embezzlement when the
employer knew the books were already in a state of disarray in order to
prevent his own reputation. 67 Miller v. Workers' Compensation Appeal
Bd., 724 A.2d 971 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
Hearing Examiner Required to Consider All
Relevant Evidence Concerning Medical Reports
When Deciding Eligibility for Disability Claims
The District of Colombia Court of Appeals vacated a hearing officer's
decision denying disability benefits.46' The court held the hearing below
was deficient and possibly prejudicial since no evidence was presented as
to the employer's physician's medical report and the relationship between
the plaintiff and her own doctor was not analyzed.469
The plaintiff, a food service employee, became injured after a fall on
the job.470 She was treated by a physician approved by the employer.47'
461See Miller, 724 A.2d at 973.462See id.463See id. at 974.
464See id. at 975.
461See id. at 972-3.
466See Miller, 724 A.2d at 977.
417See id.46SVelasquezv. District of ColumbiaDep't of Employment Servs., 723 A.2d401,402 (D.C.
1999).
4"'See id. at 403-05.
470See id. at 402.471
see id.
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Pursuant to taking a temporary leave of absence she was allotted disability
payments.472  She then returned to work but was subsequently
incapacitated by further complications arising out of the fall, and was
forced to take an additional leave of absence for which she was denied
further disability payments.4 3 While on the second leave of absence the
plaintiff obtained treatment from a physician of her own choosing.4 4 An
issue arose when the medical opinions provided by the two physicians
differed as to whether the plaintiff's secondary injuries were related to the
primary fall.475 Subsequently, the plaintiff was examined by the
defendant's physician who diagnosed the plaintiff as being unable return
to work indefinitely.476 The plaintiff was then terminated from her
position.477
The issue presented on review was whether the Director of the
Department of Employment Services erred in failing to consider three
elements of the case including the report of the employer's physician, the
plaintiff s relationship with the physician of her choosing, and whether
there was proper notice of the secondary injuries when upholding the
denial of disability payments. 8
The court held the report of the defendant's physician was crucial to
a determination of whether the plaintiff was eligible for further disability
benefits and thus it was a clear error for the hearing examiner not to
address this evidence, since it showed a connectionbetween an assessment
of the plaintiffs physical condition and her ability to return to work 47 9 It
was a further error for the Director of the Department of Employment
Services to uphold the hearing examiner's determination without
consideration of this report.480
While the court did not dispute the plaintiff's own physician was not
formally approved by the Office of Worker's Compensation, the situation
did require careful analysis.411 Under the Worker's Compensation Laws
4
"2See id.473See Velasquez, 723 A.2d at 402.474See id.47SSee id.
476See id. at 402-03.
471See id. at 402.
478See Velasquez, 723 A.2d at 403.479See id. at 403.4S'See id. at 403-04.431See id. at 403.
1999]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
a recipient is allowed to initially choose her physician.482 Since there was
a question as to whether the plaintiff ever freely chose the first approved
physician, there was also a question as to whether plaintiff's obtaining the
treatment of her own physician constituted her initial choice or a change
in physician.483 Thus, the previous ruling which declined to consider this
line of reasoning was incorrect.
484
The third issue the court addressed was that of notice regarding the
secondary injuries.485 The court noted that while federal worker's
compensation law states that there must be notice within thirty days of a
new injury, the fact that notice was absent should not bar a plaintiff from
obtaining benefits.486 Because the plaintiff notified both the approved
physician and her own physician of shoulder pain a determination of
whether proper notice was given turned partly on whether her own
physician was an appropriate provider.487 Thus the court determined all
of these issues should have been considered together.4 8 Velasquez v.
District of Colombia Dep 't ofEmployment Seivs., 723 A.2d 401 (D. C. Cir
1999).
WRONGFUL DEATH
Hospital and Physician Liable for Wrongful Death
Where No Reasonable Steps Taken to
Prevent Foreseeable Tragedy
The Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, held a psychiatrist and
hospital liable under the Wrongful Death Act for the death of a patient,
when the patient committed suicide in their care and custody, but was not
bereft of reason or insane at the time he took his own life.489
On January 27, 1990, the patient was voluntarily admitted to the
psychiatric ward of defendant hospital after taking extra Elavil given to
4 2See id. at 404.
4
"
3See Velasquez, 723 A.2d at 404-05.4 4See id. at 401-05.48SSee id. at 405.4
'
6See id.487See id. at 405-06.488See Velasquez, 723 A.2d at 406.489See Winger v. Franciscan Med. Ctr., No. 3097-0680, 1998 I11. App. LEXIS 642, at *3,
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him for depression.49 The patient, who had been admitted to the same
facility five times in the past for attempted suicide, voiced his suicidal
ideations to one of the nurses on staff. 49' The patient was placed on "close
supervision" (rather than "suicide watch") which gave him unmonitored
access to numerous potentially dangerous objects. 492 Shortly after
midnight on January 29, 1990, the patient committed suicide by hanging
himself with his shoelaces from a showerhead in the bathroom. 93
On June 3, 1991, plaintiffs Herbert Winger and Joyce Winger, the
parents of the patient, filed a wrongful death suit alleging both the
hospital's negligence and the psychiatrist's negligence in preventing their
son from committing suicide.494 The hospital and the psychiatrist moved
for summary judgment, relying on plaintiff's expert's opinion the patient
understood and appreciated his acts, his actions were intentional, and he
was not bereft of reason at the time he committed suicide.49 The district
court granted summary judgment and plaintiffs appealed.496
The appellate court held although a patient is not bereft of reason and
may appreciate the consequences of his actions, the physician and hospital
could reasonably have forseen his self-destructive conduct, and were
negligent in failing to protect him.'" In the instant case, the patient had
been admitted to the defendant's facility five times for suicide attempts in
the five previous months prior to his death.4 93 On the day of his admission
he had declared his suicidal ideations to one of his nurses.4 Accordingly,
the court reversed and remanded to the district court for further
proceedings and determination by ajury.5a Winger v. Franciscan Med.
Ctr., No. 3097-0680, 1998 IlL. App. LEXS 642, at *1 (ll. App. Ct. Mar.
11, 1998).
490See id. at *3.491See id.492See id.4 3See id.494See Winger, 1998 I11. App. LEXIS 25429, at *5.
495See id. at *5.
49"See id. at *6.
497See id. at *22.
49See id. at *26.49.Wingerv. Franciscan Med. Ctr., No. 3097-0680,1998 111. App. LEXIS 642, at *1 (111.
App. Ct. Mar. 11, 1998).
5
"See id. at *3.
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